How do we recognize ourselves as the agents of our actions? Do we use the same error detection mechanisms to monitor self-generated vs. externally imposed actions? Using event-related brain potentials (ERPs) we identified two different error-monitoring loops involved in providing a coherent sense of the agency of our actions. In the first ERP experiment the participants were embodied in a virtual body (avatar) while performing an error-prone fast reaction time task. Crucially, in certain trials, participants were deceived regarding their own actions, i.e the avatar movement did not match the participant's movement. Self-generated real-errors and false-(avatar)-errors showed very different ERP signatures and with different processing latencies: while real-errors showed a classical frontal-central error-related negativity (Ne/ERN), peaking 100 ms after error commission, false-errors elicited a larger and delayed parietal negative component (at about 350-400 ms). The violation of the sense of agency elicited by false-avatar errors showed a strong similarity to ERP signatures related to semantic or conceptual violations (N400 component). In a follow-up ERP control experiment, a subset of the same participants merely acted as observers of the avatar correct and error movements. This experimental situation did not elicit the N400 component associated with agency violation. Thus, the present results show a clear neural dissociation between internal and external error-monitoring loops responsible for distinguishing our self-generated errors from those imposed externally, opening new avenues for the study of the mental processes underlying the integration of internal and sensory feedback information while being actors of our own actions.
Introduction
Humans can be successfully embodied in a surrogate body, either of an avatar Banakou et al. 2013) or a robot (Kishore et al. 2014) , opening a number of interesting scientific questions.
For example, are we able to clearly discriminate whether the origin of an action is due to the intention of the human participant or the surrogate itself? Furthermore, to what extent is our brain able to distinguish self-vs. externally-generated erroneous actions which may undermine one's natural sense of agency?
Here, we shed light on this issue describing different neurophysiological signatures associated to both types of erroneous actions (self-generated vs. externally imposed errors) in a scenario with embodiment in a full virtual surrogate body.
In normal circumstances, when our on-going actions and the predicted sensory consequences of these actions (feedback) are coherent, we experience the sensation of agency with respect to our actions ("this action is mine") and we are typically not even aware of such considerations (Pacherie 2001; Gallagher 2005) . However, in the case where there is a conflict between the predicted consequences of our actions and their actual consequences (Slachevsky et al. 2001; Haggard and Chambon 2012) we might detect an agency violation through an error detection mechanism (referred to here as External Error-Monitoring Loop -E-eml) . This mechanism might be constantly checking whether the final sensory feedback is coherent with expected sensory consequences of our actions, created using an internal (efference) copy of our motor commands. These sensory feedback estimations during movement may rely strongly on previous representations of the body in terms of limb position, movement, or posture which normally give us a naturally sense of being the agents of our actions (Giummarra et al., 2008) . In the case of a mismatch in this comparison between expected and actual sensory feedback outcomes a disruption of the sensation of agency might be elicited (Synofzik et al. 2008) .
While this E-eml might be constantly checking the congruency between our external and internal worlds, a concurrent internal and rapid error-detection mechanism evaluates whether our on-going motor plans are correct, implementing very fast corrective actions in order to prevent and abort the production of erroneous responses. Several models have proposed that an internal forward signal -efference copy -is used to generate constant predictions of the consequences of our actions which are used to compute error deviations from the expected goal even before the action has been completed (Holst and Mittelstaedt 1950; Wolpert and Miall 1996; Jeannerod 2006; Crapse and Sommer 2008) . This internal errormonitoring loop (I-eml) has been associated with the Error-related Negativity or Error Negativity (Ne/ERN), an Event Related Potential (ERP) component appearing approximately 60 ms after the commission of a real-error (Falkenstein et al., 1990 (Falkenstein et al., , 1991 Gehring et al. 1993; Rodriguez-Fornells et al. 2002; Holroyd et al. 2005) and elicited in the anterior cingulate cortex ( Ullsperger and von Cramon 2001; Holroyd et al. 2004; Marco-Pallarés et al. 2008) .
Even though these two error detection mechanisms -E-eml and I-eml -rely on similar representations (both rely on the efference copy), the computations that each performs involve access to different types of feedback information. The main aim of the present research was to functionally dissociate the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the external and the internal EML. To accomplish this goal we performed two ERP experiments. In Exp. 1 we recorded for first time ERPs in healthy participants embodied in a virtual body while they carried out an error-prone reaction time task (Rodriguez-Fornells et al. 2002) in a fully Immersive Virtual Environment (IVE) (see Fig. 1a and Movie 1 in Supplementary Material). Critically, on a few occasions, participants' correct responses were falsified by an "erroneous" movement of their embodied avatar (i.e. avatar-errors) which perturbed their sense of agency. ERP signals related to self-generated errors and avatar-errors were then compared. While the elicitation of the ERN component was expected for self-generated errors (as a reflection of the I-eml), no specific prediction was made regarding externally-generated (virtual body) errors. Exp. 2 was carried out in order to rule out the possibility that the ERP effects observed in Exp.1 for external-generated errors could have been due to the mere observation of a virtual human performing a wrong action rather than the output of the external-error monitoring loop (E-eml).
Fig. 1. Experimental design used in Experiment 1.
A. Participant in the laboratory with the head mounted display (HMD), electroencephalography (EEG) and the head and hand tracking systems. B. First Person Perspective (1PP) of the virtual arrow flanker task. Participants were instructed to perform fast movements with the right hand in the direction of the central arrow.
After each movement the hand returned to the starting position (middle panel). The virtual hand followed the tracked real hand, but in some trials the displayed virtual hand movement was incongruent (InCM) with the participants' real movements, thus generating an "false-(avatar)-error". Three conditions were relevant for the EEG analysis, correct responses, realerrors and false-errors. C. Gender matched avatar of the participant in the Immersive Virtual Environment (IVE).
Materials & Methods

Participants
Eighteen neurologically healthy right-handed volunteers from the Faculty of Psychology at the University of Barcelona participated in the first experiment (Exp. 1) (6 men; mean age, 26 ± 7 years). Two weeks after the participation in the main experiment, nine participants (3 men; mean age, 25 ± 8 years) agreed to return to the lab to participate in a control experiment (Exp. 2). All gave written informed consent according to the declaration of Helsinki and were paid for their participation. The ethical committee from the University of Barcelona gave approval to the project (Institutional Review Board IRB 00003099).
Apparatus
Participants were fitted with a stereo NVIS nVisor SX111 head-mounted display (HMD). This has dual SXGA displays with 76°H x 64°V degrees field of view (FOV) per eye, totalling a wide field-of-view 111° horizontal and 60º vertical, with a resolution of 1280 x 1024 per eye displayed at 60Hz. Head tracking was performed by a 6-degrees of freedom (DOF) Intersense IS-900 device.
A gender matched virtual body (or avatar) was displayed from a first person perspective (1PP) with respect to the virtual body's eyes, so that it visually substituted the real body of the participant (see Fig. 1 ; see also Movie 1 at the Supplementary Material). The position of the participants' real hand was tracked using an optical infrared system (12 camera OptiTrack). The whole arm kinematics (hand, elbow and shoulder positions and rotations) were computed from the hand position using Inverse Kinematics.
Our setup supported the real-time display of the avatar with 6 DOF in the head and 4 DOF in the right arm giving the participant strong visual-motor coherence between real and virtual right-arm movements.
The virtual environment was programmed in the XVR system (Tecchia et al. 2010 ) and the virtual character displayed through the HALCA library (Gillies and Spanlang 2010; Spanlang et al. 2014 ).
Procedure
Experiment 1
Participants performed a standard error-prone Eriksen flanker attention task (Rodriguez-Fornells et al. 2002) and were required to respond quickly to left or right-pointing arrows (in the center of the stimulus array) in the presence of compatible or conflicting surrounding flankers (see Fig.1b ). The movements of the avatar had no noticeable delays when compared to the participant's real movements and this strong visual-motor synchrony between avatar and participant's movements was expected to create a strong feeling of ownership (Slater et al. 2009; Banakou et al. 2013; Llobera et al. 2013; Peck et al. 2013) . Hence this belongs to the category of body ownership illusions evoked by using appropriate synchronous multisensory (visual, tactile and proprioceptive) stimulation (Lenggenhager et al. 2007; Petkova and Ehrsson 2008; Slater et al. 2010; González-Franco et al. 2014 ) that can produce an illusion of ownership even over objects that are not part of the body (Botvinick and Cohen 1998; Ehrsson et al. 2004; Longo et al. 2008) .
In the virtual environment, the stimuli presentations consisted of three black arrows oriented horizontally, one central (target) and two flanker arrowheads above and below ( Fig. 1b ). Participants were instructed to respond both accurately and quickly to the direction of the central arrow by moving the hand to either of the two assigned buttons that were on the table. The virtual table and buttons were registered with the real table by which participants were sitting, so that there was no conflict between their tactile sensation of feeling the table and the buttons, and the visual input of seeing their virtual hand touch the table and buttons ( Fig. 1 ). Participants were instructed to make only one response per trial and to avoid correction movements. At each trial after the response the hand was returned by the participants to the initial position equidistant to the two buttons.
We refer to the trials as compatible, when the central arrow (target) had the same direction of flankers; or incompatible, when target and flankers had opposite directions. The flanker incompatible condition was presented 60% (768 trials) of the times and the compatible condition 40% (512), both presented in pseudo-random order. The percentage of incompatible trials was larger in order to increase the number of erroneous responses due to the presence of incompatible flankers. The duration of each stimuli presentation was 150 ms and the interval between two successive presentations (SOA) was 1150 ms. A fixation cross was present during this interval, 1000 ms, after the disappearance of the stimulus array.
Every 20 trials, participants had 5 seconds of pause to blink.
Experiment 1 was divided in two experimental block conditions, Congruent Movement (CM) condition and the InCongruent Movement (InCM) condition. The experiment always started with the CM block and was followed by the InCM block. In the CM Condition participants became familiar with the virtual environment and the task. In this condition, and in order to create a strong illusion of body ownership, the movements of the avatar were always the same as those executed by the participant. In this block, participants performed 160 trials in total (96 incompatible, 64 compatible trials). At the end of this CM condition participants were required to complete the Experience Questionnaire (see below for a description) concerned with body ownership and agency.
After a short break the InCongruent Movement (InCM) condition started. The InCM was divided in two blocks of 640 trials (approximately 15 minutes each separated by 10 min of rest). During the InCM blocks, in some infrequent trials the avatar produced an unexpected hand movement (external-generated error) even though the participant had performed the correct one. Specifically, when participants moved the hand in one direction the virtual hand moved in the opposite direction, causing an external-generated error, hereafter (false)-avatar-errors. The InCM trials were distributed so that they occurred randomly with an average of once every 20 trials and were never the first or last trial before the pauses. The total number of InCM trials matched approximately the percentage of natural errors in the compatible flanker (approx. 5-6% of trials, 64 trials in all participants). Importantly, we avoided introducing avatar errors in the incompatible trials, because in this condition, the non-compatible flankers tend to pre-activate the incorrect motor channels (resulting in more errors in the incompatible trials when compared to the compatible ones) and therefore the evaluation of the avatar error could have been unclear for the participant.
To accomplish the effect of inserting the avatar error we made the hand move symmetrically with respect to the real hand movements (but in the opposite direction). In the InCM trials participants did not notice anything wrong until they started moving, since the virtual hand position was also at the initial position during these trials. Using the real hand position for calculating the InCM trials was very advantageous in terms of the plausibility of the symmetric virtual movement, since it mirrored the spatio-temporal movement as the real one (without noticeable delay). The crucial trials for our ERP analysis were those in which the participant did respond in the correct direction but the virtual hand went into the opposite direction thus provoking a false-(avatar)-error. At the end of this second block, participants were requested to complete again the Experience Questionnaire of body ownership and agency.
Experiment 2
Exp. 2 was carried out in order to rule out the possibility that the ERP effects found in Exp.1 in the InCM condition (see below) were due to the mere observation of an avatar performing a wrong action instead of the output of the E-eml. The same participants from Exp. 1 were invited back to the laboratory and were again immersed in the 1PP IVE environment as in the previous experiment. However, on this occasion, we only asked the participants to observe and pay attention to the avatar performance from a 1PP and to count the number of times that the avatar was performing an erroneous action. Unknown to participants, each one saw an exact reproduction of their own session digitally recorded during the previous ERP experiment. The pre-recorded movements were first cleaned of incomplete or corrected movements by substituting these by complete movements of the same participant, i.e. participants only visualized errors or correct trials. In order to avoid covert errors of the observer, the flanker arrows were removed and only the middle arrow remained in the screen (van Schie et al. 2004; de Bruijn & von Rhein, 2012) . As demonstrated in the study of van Schie et al. (2014) observers activated the motor cortex associated with the correct response at a sub-threshold level, thus generating a representation of the appropriate response associated to the target stimuli presented. In this regard, it is important to eliminate conflicting information in the incompatible condition in order to prevent possible covert errors (incorrect preactivation of the incorrect motor channel). Participants were also told that at the end of the observation they would be asked whether the pre-recorded performance was theirs or from another participant. The aim of these instructions was to increase their level of attention. At the end of this experiment participants were requested to complete the questionnaire of body ownership and agency.
The Experience Questionnaire
Participants were instructed to complete a 9-item questionnaire (in Spanish) after each of the CM, InCM conditions and at the end of Exp. 2. Most questions were adapted from the study of Botvinick & Cohen (Botvinick and Cohen 1998) and some additional questions were added in as in other body ownership related experiments (Banakou et al. 2013 ). The questionnaire contained a set of assertions that were scored with a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" (-3) to "strongly agree" (+3 Q1 and Q3 were related to the sense of body ownership. Q2 and Q4 were related to the sense of proprioception and localization of the hand that participants experienced. Q5 and Q7 were related with visual-motor integration processes and violation of the sense of agency, important for the evaluation of the effectiveness of our experimental manipulation. Q6 was an exploratory question on motor performance to assess how the visualization of the virtual movements influenced participants' real movements. Indirectly, this question assesses also agency violation. Q8 was a filler question about which we had no expectations. Q9 was a consistency check for the task performance in each condition, evaluating whether participants were able to differentiate their own errors from the false-(avatar)-errors.
Q9 was expected to be higher in the InCM than the CM condition. This questionnaire therefore included information about body ownership, localization and agency (Longo et al. 2008; Kilteni et al. 2012 ).
Electrophysiological Recording
EEG was recorded from tin electrodes mounted in an elastic cap and located at 27 standard positions (Fz, F7/8, F3/4, Fc1/2 Fc5/6, Cz, C3/4, T7/8, Cp1/2, Cp5/6, Pz, P3/4, P7/P8, Po1/2, O1/2). All scalp electrodes were referenced offline to the mean activity of the left mastoid. Vertical eye movements (Electrooculogram, EOG) were monitored with electrodes located above and below the right eye.
Horizontal EOG was collected from electrodes located at the outer canthus of each eye. Both vertical and horizontal EOG were used for artefact rejection and correction. We used an approach based on blind source separation (BSS) algorithms that includes an automated independent component analysis (ICA) to isolate and remove electroocular components from the EEG data rather than rejecting artifactcontaminated trials (Joyce et al. 2004 ). Impedances were kept below 5 kOhm. The electrophysiological signals were filtered with band-pass of 0.1-70 Hz (half-amplitude cutoffs) and digitized at a rate of 250
Hz. Trials with amplitude of more or less than 100 µV were rejected off-line.
For the behavioural and ERP analysis only correct and error responses entered in the analysis and all error-correction movements were excluded (see Fig. S1 for an example in Supplementary Material).
Trials that immediately followed a resting period, a real-error or a false-(avatar)-error were discarded from the analysis. Finally, trials with reaction times shorter than 150 ms or longer than 2.5 standard deviation of the individual RT were also excluded from the behavioral and ERPs analysis.
For ERP analysis we were interested in three specific conditions from the InCM blocks: (i) correct responses towards the target; (ii) when the avatar was introducing false-avatar-errors; and (iii) when participant really performed an error (self-generated real-errors)". The mean number of trials that finally entered in the ERP analysis for correct responses was 785 ± 30 (mean ± SD), 119 ± 20 for real-errors and 41 ± 2 false-avatar-errors. A previous pairwise comparison between compatible and incompatible trials showed no differences in the Ne/ERN amplitude for both type of erroneous trials and no differences also in between correct compatible and correct incompatible trials in this time-window (80-120 ms after response Finally, to inspect the impact of individual differences regarding the experience of body ownership with the avatar in error-related brain activity associated with avatar-errors we performed a correlation analysis (Pearson correlation) with the mean amplitude of the N400 component in the false-avatar-error (falseerror vs. correct amplitude difference) and the psychometric assessment of the illusion of body ownership.
For the evaluation of the subjective strength of virtual body ownership we chose the ratings obtained immediately after the fist block (CM condition), where the expected illusion is stronger (due to the congruence of all avatar and self-generated movements). We computed the difference score between Q1 and the control condition (Q3) and correlated this value with the N400 difference amplitude. The difference between Q1-Q3 represents a normalization of the body ownership illusion, a high score in Q1 and a low score in Q3 indicates stronger body ownership illusion.
Movement Analysis
The recorded hand tracker movements were analyzed offline to compute response accuracy and reaction times. This was critical to calculate the onset movement and response-locked event-related potentials (r-ERPs). In order to correctly detect the participants' responses we used the projected position of the hand as the Euclidean distance on the axis between the two buttons. For each trial we distinguished among four different response types: correct, error, corrected and no response. Once the response was classified we used the derivative of the position to assess the onset movement described as the moment just before the hand starts to move (see Fig. S1 , Supplementary Material).
Results
Experiment 1: Error monitoring of real-errors vs. false-(avatar)-errors
Assessment of the ownership and agency illusions towards the virtual body
In order to evaluate the illusion of body ownership, localization and agency in this experimental setting, volunteers were instructed to complete a 9-item questionnaire (see Methods) after each of these CM and InCM conditions (Botvinick and Cohen 1998; Ehrsson et al. 2004; Longo et al. 2008) . Non-parametric
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests were used to assess participants' questionnaire scores related to the experience of ownership towards the avatar during Exp. 1 (Fig. 2, shows the medians and interquartile ranges). During the CM condition (see Fig. 2 ), when the avatar movements corresponded to those of the real body, maintained high in both CM and InCM conditions, with no significant difference between the two conditions (Z = 1.519, p = 0.13). Notice also that the control question that we included for body ownership (Q3, "It seemed as if I might have had more than one body") was significantly lower than Q1 in both CM (Z = 3.682, p = 0.0002) and InCM condition (Z = 2.489, p = 0.013; the global comparison between the Q1 and the control question Q3 was significant, Z = -4.2857, P < 0.0001). The occasional divergence between real and virtual hand locations during avatar-errors also had an effect on the hand localization item (Q2), the scores for the CM were greater than for the InCM condition (Z = 2.902, P = 0.004).
Participant's sense of agency (associated to visual-motor integration processes) was impaired or partially disrupted when avatar-errors began to appear in the InCM condition as demonstrated by the scores in questions Q5, Q6, Q7 and Q9 (Fig. 2 ). Q5 mean scores ("The movements of the virtual hand seemed to be my movements") were significantly higher in the CM than the InCM condition (Z = -3.266, P = 0.0012).
In contrast the control question Q7 ("Sometimes, the virtual hand seemed to be moving by itself") scored higher in the InCM condition than the CM (Z = 3.648, P = 0.0003). In the InCM condition Q7 was marginally greater than Q5 (Z = -1.963, P = 0.05). This result shows that the sense of agency was impaired by the introduction of avatar-errors in the InCM. The InCM condition also influenced significantly more the participants' feeling about their movements (Q6) than the CM one (Z=1.978, p = 0.048). Finally, it is worth mentioning that in the InCM condition participants were aware that the errors introduced by the avatar were not their own errors (Q9, "It seems sometimes that the errors were not caused by myself") (for the comparison InCM vs. CM, Z=3.543, p = 0.0004).
Overall, the CM condition induced a high level of embodiment towards the self-represented avatar (as measured by body ownership, localization and agency) (Banakou et al. 2013; Maselli and Slater 2013; Banakou and Slater 2014) . However, although a strong feeling of body ownership is still maintained in the InCM, the feeling of agency was disrupted and participants were aware that the errors introduced sporadically by the avatar were not their own errors.
Behavioral performance
The performance of participants during the reaction time task was as expected for this paradigm. The mean percentage of own-errors produced by the participants was equal in the CM (mean + SD, 17 ± 9%) and InCM (17 ± 8%) conditions (t(17) < 1), thus the inclusion of avatar errors did not have a major impact on the overall performance. As in other versions of the reaction time Erikson flanker task, our manipulation in the virtual environment revealed that participants were more accurate and faster responding to compatible trials compared to the incompatible ones: accuracy (compatible trials: 91.5 ± 6.9%; incompatible trials: 77.1 ± 10.5%, t (17) = 11.302 P < 0.001) and mean reaction time for correct responses (compatible: 259 ± 36 ms; incompatible trials: 273 ± 44 ms, t (17) = -4.48, p < 0.001). Finally, the percentage of missed trials (no-response) along the experiment was very low (0.6 % ± 0.6 SD in CM block; 0.1 % ± 0.4 in the InCM condition), although being significant across conditions (t (23) = 2.8, p < 0.009).
We also investigated the extent to which compensatory cognitive control mechanisms were triggered after the real-or the false-error. As has been previously described, errors are usually followed by more accurate and slower responses (e.g., post-error slowing effect), which reflects control compensatory mechanisms triggered automatically after an erroneous response (Rabbitt 2002; Marco-Pallarés et al. 2008; Logan and Crump 2010) . As expected, self-generated real-errors were followed by slower correct reactions than correct responses preceded by correct trials (e.g., 270 ± 46 ms vs. 262 ± 42 ms, respectively; t (17) = 2.7, P = 0.027). Strikingly, after false-(avatar)-errors there was an even slower correct reaction (post-error slowing effect, 292 ± 51 ms; comparison with correct trials, 262 ± 42 ms: t (17) = 7.1, P < 0.001). The greater post-error slowing effect after false-(avatar)-errors (~30 ms) compared to self-generated realerrors (~8 ms) is surprising considering that during avatar-errors the participant performed a correct action. This result might reflect a great impact in performance when participants detected a discrepancy between the expected (correct) output of their motor command and the observed (incorrect) movement performed by their avatar self-representation, suggesting that compensatory cognitive control mechanisms might as well be activated. 1.3. ERP signatures of error-monitoring for real-errors vs. false-(avatar) -errors ERP responses during the performance of both experimental conditions are depicted in Fig. 3a .
3.
Participants' self-generated real-errors when compared to their correct responses showed the standard development of the Ne/ERN component (see blue line in Fig. 3a ) (Gehring et al. 1993; Rodriguez-Fornells et al. 2002; Holroyd et al. 2005) . This component peaked at about 100 ms immediately after the production of an error at frontocentral brain locations (see difference waveform, real-error vs. correct responses, in Fig. 3b ). This component was followed by a positive error component (known as the Pe)
and showing a peak in between 200-300 ms (see difference waveform for real-error condition in Fig. 3b) and in accordance to previous studies using similar paradigms (Overbeek et al., 2005; Rodriguez-Fornells et al., 2002; Kramer et al., 2007) . Fig. 3. ERP results of the Exp. 1 (participants executing the actions in 1PP) and control Exp.
(participants observing actions in 1PP). A. Left panel. Response-locked grand-average waveforms during Exp. 1 at frontal (Fz) and parietal (Pz) locations for Correct responses (black line), real-errors (blue line) and false-(avatar)-errors (green line). At the right panel and for Exp. 2, we depict the grand-averages for Observed Errors (red line) and Observed Correct responses (grey line) conditions. 2. B. Difference waveforms and related scalp distribution maps for the contrasts real-errors minus correct responses (blue line), false-(avatar)-errors minus correct responses (green line) and Observed Errors -Observed Correct
Responses (red line). Notice that while real-errors showed the standard frontocentral Ne/ERN peaking at about 100 ms (blue line), false-(avatar)-errors (green line) yielded a slower negative parietal component (green line, at about 300-400 ms, the N400) Fig. 3a) , developing from 250 to 500 ms and peaking at about 310-360 ms. The amplitude of this N400 was larger on false-(avatar)-errors when compared to realerrors and correct responses as revealed by a main effect of Correctness, (F(2,34) = 14.4, P < 0.001). The N400 effect after false-errors was maximal at parietal locations (see difference waveform, false-errors vs.
correct reponses, and its topographical distribution at Fig. 3b ) and somewhat lateralized to the right hemisphere (Correctness x Anterior-Posterior: F(4,68) = 11.8, P < 0.001; Correctness x Anteriorposterior x Lateral locations: F(8,136) = 2.7, P < 0.05). Further pairwise comparisons confirmed that the amplitude of the N400 at Pz electrode was enhanced in the comparisons between the false-error condition and real-errors (t(17) = 4.6, P < 0.001) and between false-error vs. correct responses (t(17) = 5.5, P < 0.001).
Furthermore we observed that the amplitude of N400 over parietal regions elicited by avatar-errors (for the difference false-error vs. correct responses) was negatively correlated with the subjective strength of virtual body ownership (computed as the difference Q1-Q3) (r(18) = -0.6, P < 0.009) (see Fig. 4 ). (r(18) = -0.6, P < 0.009). The amplitude of the N400 component was computed subtracting false-(avatar)-errors minus Correct responses in the incongruent movement (InCM) condition over a selected region of interest over parietal locations (Pz, P3, P4 electrodes) . The subjective strength of virtual body ownership (embodiment) was computed as the difference Q1-Q3, where Q1 and Q3 are items of the subjective questionnaire (see Fig. 2 ).
Fig. 4. Correlation between the strength of the virtual embodiment illusion (feeling of ownership) and the N400 component
Thus, the larger the subjective feeling of body ownership as measured by the subjective report, the stronger the amplitude of the negative parietal signal following avatar-errors. This result suggest that participants who experienced stronger subjective body ownership elicited stronger N400 modulations in response to agency violations.
This result is important as it suggests a neurophysiological dissociation between the I-eml and E-eml, which is involved in the evaluation of the sense of agency of our own actions in conflicting contexts. In ERP analysis, different topographical distributions and latencies of two ERP components provide direct evidence of the necessary involvement of at least different neurophysiological mechanisms (Picton et al. 1995) . In order to test more accurately whether the scalp distribution of both components differed, we carried out an additional statistical analysis considering all the 27 electrode locations registered and testing for the interaction between Condition [Ne/ERN (real-error minus correct response difference) -N400 (false-error minus correct response difference)] x Electrodes at 27 locations. A significant interaction was obtained (F(1,17)=5.3, P < 0.001) demonstrating the implication of distinct neural sources in the generation of both ERP components associated respectively to the I-eml (Ne/ERN) and the E-eml (N400).
Experiment 2: error monitoring of observed avatar-errors
Assessment of the ownership and agency illusions towards the virtual body
During the control Exp. 2 participants (see Fig. 2 ) reported lesser subjective body ownership when comparing Q1 scores to the Exp. 1 CM condition's scores (Z= -2.032, p = 0.042). This result suggests that the absence of visual-motor synchrony disrupted the experience of body ownership. Additionally, the proprioceptive consistency of the hand localization item (Q2) was also significantly diminished in Exp. 2 when compared to the Exp. 1 CM condition (Z= -2.687, p < 0. 007).
Regarding visual-motor integration (Q5) the comparison shows a reduction in the sense of agency during Exp. 2 when compared to Exp. 1 CM condition (Z= -2.536, p < 0. 011). Further analysis on (Q5 vs. Q7) showed significant differences (Z= -2.570, p = 0.012), meaning that overall, participants noticed that they could not control the avatar movements, thus showing a low sense of agency.
Overall, these results are consistent with our expectations and show a low level of embodiment towards the self-represented avatar when compared to the Exp. 1 scores since the three most commonly described aspects of embodiment -body ownership, localization and agency -had low scores during the observation control Exp. 2. This result demonstrates that the visual-motor incongruence between own actions (not moving hands, only observing) and the perception of the avatar's movements extinguished the experience of body ownership and agency which was present in Exp. 1 (as expected considering previous findings (Banakou and Slater 2014) ).
ERP signatures of observed avatar-errors
The ERP analysis of Exp. 2, in which participants merely observed avatar erroneous actions (see Fig. 3a Fig. 5 for a summary) . Paired t-test comparisons confirmed the differences between the observational-avatar Ne/ERN and the false-errors N400 at Fz (t(8) = 3.2, P < 0.05) and at Pz locations, where the N400 amplitude was maximal (t(8) = 6.8, P < 0.001). 
Fig. 5. Summary of the mean amplitudes of the ERP components identified (mean ± SEM):
Discussion
In this study, two different neurophysiological signatures appeared associated to the embodied-avatar errors resulting from the internal (I-eml) and external error monitoring (E-eml) loops, the Ne/ERN and the N400 component, respectively. The appearance of the first component (Ne/ERN) was expected to generalize from previous results on internal error monitoring of real body movements (Gehring et al. 1993; Rodriguez-Fornells et al. 2002; Holroyd et al. 2005) to the virtual body. Indeed this is the first study to show the appearance of the Ne/ERN component in humans embodied in a virtual body. However, the appearance of the N400 during the false-errors (avatar induced errors) was unexpected. As mentioned earlier, our ability to recognize ourselves as agents of our own behavior depends on constantly monitoring the sensory consequences of our on-going actions. In normal everyday circumstances we experience an implicit and diffuse sense of coherence regarding the feeling of agency, mostly because there is a perfect congruence between the internal representations of our actions (e.g., efference copy), the sensory predictions of our actions and the flow of resulting sensory events (multimodal reafferent feedback) (Pacherie 2001) . When a mismatch is detected between any of these internal predictions and re-afferent signals, a violation of the sense of agency might be triggered. Thus the N400 could be reflecting the output of this comparison process, which might lie at the core of the E-eml.
Interestingly and in agreement with this, a significant association was observed between the amplitude of the N400 component (false-error minus correct responses) and the subjective feeling of body ownership (see Fig. 4 ). The greater the subjective feeling of body ownership, the stronger the N400 amplitude or the electrophysiological signature of agency violation. Furthermore, the timing of this comparison process (with approx. 350-400 ms delay after the error) is slower than that needed for the I-eml (in between 60-150 ms) which depends exclusively on the efference copy information. Since the E-eml requires the processing of different feedback information arriving at the somatosensory, visual and auditory regions, this comparison process might not be finished until the degree of coherence is computed and a coherent multimodal representation is built.
More importantly, the parietal distribution of the N400 component converges with the results of functional neuroimaging and lesion studies in which the role of the angular gyrus in the inferior parietal cortex has been highlighted in relation to diminished feeling of agency (Farrer et al. 2008) and the comparison processes between predicted and actual consequences of on-going actions (Sirigu et al. 2004; Desmurget et al. 2009; Chambon et al. 2013) . Indeed it has been proposed that this region might contain an internal model used for conscious monitoring of voluntary actions (Sirigu et al. 1996 (Sirigu et al. , 2004 Desmurget and Grafton 2000; Farrer et al. 2008) . Increased activation in this region is observed for stronger subjective feelings of non-agency reflecting the elicitation of an error signal associated to the mismatch detected between predicted and actual consequences of on-going actions. This error signal might trigger therefore the conscious experience of perturbed sense of control or agency. Interestingly, several studies have shown that this mechanism of agency attribution is probably impaired in schizophrenia and might explain the problems associated with delusions of control, auditory hallucinatory experiences or thought insertion (Daprati et al. 1997; Frith 2005; Synofzik et al. 2010) . Similarly, right inferior parietal cortex lesions have been associated with delusions about the patient's limb that may be perceived as an alien object, belonging to another person or causing alien hand movement (Nightingale 1982; Leiguarda et al. 1993; Daprati et al. 1997; Assal et al. 2007 ). Although caution is needed in the interpretation of EEG data and the location of its neural sources, we believe that the N400 component associated in the present study to the E-eml could reflect an ERP component associated to this error signal generated in the inferior parietal cortex and associated to conscious error monitoring of voluntary actions. Importantly, although no previous ERP studies have investigated the violation of the sense of agency in humans with a strong virtual embodiment illusion of an avatar body, two previous ERP studies on externally-caused errors (induced by simulated technical malfunctions), showed a similar negative ERP component as that reported here although with different onset latencies (Gentsch et al. 2009; Steinhauser and Kiesel 2011) . In the first study (Gentsch et al. 2009 ), errors were induced by omitting a normally occurring positive visual feedback signal that occurred nearly immediately after a correct response (with 10 ms delay). Participants knew in advance that these computer system malfunctions could happen due to unexpected technical problems. Thus participants performed a correct response in this scenario and the expected-immediate feedback was omitted in some trials. The absence of positive feedback elicited a negativity with a similar posterior-parietal scalp distribution as the one observed in our experiment (with an earlier onset, at 250 ms) (see also Steinhauser and Kiesel 2011) . The authors used independent component analysis (ICA) and found that this delayed negativity could also be associated to a source in the medial prefrontal cortex, similar to that observed in the standard Ne/ERN for real-errors.
These studies and ours converge in pointing to the existence of both error monitoring loops (I-eml / Eeml). A similar idea of a dual-route structure for conscious and non-conscious decision making has been proposed (Del Cul et al. 2009 ) and applied to the detection and correction of fast human errors (Charles et al. 2013) . From this perspective, two parallel routes might simultaneously accumulate evidence from the sensory input: a fast non-conscious sensory-motor route and a slower but more accurate conscious route.
In making rapid decisions, the unconscious route probably dominates and responses might be triggered before the slower conscious route emits its conservative judgment. A discrepancy between the outputs emitted by these two routes could signal that an error has occurred (Coles et al. 2001) or that conflict exists between the actual and intended actions (Botvinick et al. 2001; Yeung et al. 2004) . From this perspective, while the I-eml might be the monitoring processes implemented in the unconscious route, the E-eml could be associated to the computation of a slower but more accurate route for conscious monitoring predicted and actual consequences of on-going actions. Notice that this unconscious route associated to the I-eml might fit well with current interpretation that the Ne/ERN component is associated to unconscious conflict or error detection mechanisms (Endrass et al., 2007; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Rodriguez-Fornells et al., 2002; Wessel et al., 2012; Yeung et al., 2004) and that its appearance precedes the appearance of the subjective perception of error commission (which is normally delayed in time, see Rabbitt, 2002 ).
An intriguing question to be explored is the exact computational nature of this comparison process involved in the E-eml. The N400 component discovered in the present study associated to the external error monitoring resembles in terms of scalp distribution and latency the well-known N400 component associated with semantic and conceptual violations and classically associated with the activation of amodal semantic memory (McPherson and Holcomb 1999) . This component has been classically attributed to the violation of semantic or conceptual information (Kutas and Federmeier 2011) (e.g., when listening to the sentence "I am going to eat a house") and it has also been found to occur as a result of observing incorrect motor plans (e.g., inserting screwdriver versus key into a keyhole) (Bach et al. 2009 ) .
Thus an interesting question is the extent to which the clash in the feeling of agency ("this is not my action") reflects a violation in the process of understanding our own actions (or our own "body movement semantics"). In this sense, the comparison process underlying the ability to recognize ourselves as agents of our actions might not be too different from that carried out when comparing linguistic inputs or conceptual representations, as it might rely as well on the congruence of our own actions and the external consequences generated by these actions. Thus, observing the representation of an embodied body performing a non-planned action might be evaluated in a similar fashion as a semanticconceptual violation. In a way, we might be somehow observing "semantic violations of our own body actions".
In conclusion, using ERPs, we dissociated internal and external error-monitoring controllers and we unraveled the timing of both monitoring processes associated with the violation of the feeling of agency.
The results provide important evidence about how to distinguish at the neurophysiological level own-vs.
externally-generated errors in surrogate bodies that could be governed by remotely located participants.
We believe the present results provide new neural evidence regarding the integration of internal and sensory feedback information in the build-up of a coherent sense of agency and opens new avenues for studying the mental processes underlying agency attribution in healthy and clinical populations using virtual bodies.
